Theodore Roosevelt and the Making of an American Navy
- Ray Via II
- Aug 30
- 5 min read
Updated: Aug 30
Theodore Roosevelt had a profound and transformational vision for the U.S. Navy. He saw it not just as a branch of the military, but as the backbone of America’s emergence as a global power, essential for national security, economic prosperity, and international influence. His navalism was never a passing interest; it was a lifelong commitment rooted in his personal philosophy of strength, discipline, and preparedness. Roosevelt believed that if the United States aspired to greatness, it had to show resolve not only in words but in the visible power of its fleet.¹
For Roosevelt, the Navy was both practical and symbolic. Practically, it secured American shores, protected trade routes, and extended the reach of U.S. policy abroad. Symbolically, it represented a nation once dismissed as a backwater republic now standing alongside Europe’s great empires. This blend of realism and idealism defined Roosevelt’s approach, and naval expansion became one of the hallmarks of his political life.²
Childhood and the Strenuous Life
As a boy, Roosevelt suffered from chronic asthma, often leaving him confined indoors and unable to join other boys in vigorous play. His father, Theodore Roosevelt Sr., urged him to build his body as he had built his mind.³ Roosevelt responded with boxing, weightlifting, riding, and hiking, slowly remaking himself into a vigorous young man.
That transformation hardened into a philosophy: the strenuous life. He believed weakness, whether in individuals or nations, invited decline. Just as he had conquered frailty, so too must America shed timidity and project strength. The Navy, with its steel hulls, heavy guns, and crews drilled to perfection, became for him the embodiment of that philosophy.
The Naval War of 1812 and Intellectual Foundations
Roosevelt’s navalism first appeared in print with The Naval War of 1812, published in 1882 when he was 24. The book included diagrams, battle narratives, and strategic analysis. Roosevelt praised officers like Oliver Hazard Perry and Isaac Hull for their skill, but he did not shy from criticizing U.S. failures.⁴
Naval officers hailed it as one of the most accurate American treatments of the subject, while scholars recognized Roosevelt as a serious thinker. The book gave him credibility in policy debates and reflected a recurring theme: nations that neglected their fleets would pay dearly in war. At the same time, those who invest in readiness can secure global influence. ⁵
The Influence of Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890) provided Roosevelt’s ideas with a global framework. Mahan argued that history’s great powers had always been maritime powers, and naval supremacy determined economic and political strength.⁶
Roosevelt devoured the book and championed it among policymakers. Correspondence with Mahan reinforced his convictions. When Roosevelt pressed for steel battleships, overseas coaling stations, and a fleet capable of projecting power worldwide, he was translating Mahan’s theories into American policy.⁷ Together, Mahan and Roosevelt shaped the generation of American naval thought that dominated early 20th-century strategy.
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Roosevelt’s appointment in 1897 as Assistant Secretary of the Navy gave him the platform to implement his vision. He pushed for steel-hulled ships, gunnery training, and efficient supply logistics. Coal and ammunition were to be constantly available, and readiness could not wait for war.⁸
Before the war with Spain was declared, Roosevelt ordered Commodore George Dewey’s squadron in the Pacific to be prepared for immediate action. Critics called this reckless, but Dewey’s decisive victory at Manila Bay in May 1898 confirmed Roosevelt’s strategic foresight.⁹ His tenure transformed the Assistant Secretaryship from a bureaucratic office into a staging ground for naval modernization and global ambition.
The Spanish-American War and Sea Power
The Spanish-American War of 1898, though brief, validated Roosevelt’s belief in the decisive role of naval power. American fleets destroyed Spanish squadrons in Manila and Santiago, enabling successful landings and rapid victory.¹⁰
Roosevelt, resigning to lead the Rough Riders, gained fame at San Juan Hill, but he never lost sight of the naval dimension. The war’s outcome underscored his central point: control of the seas determined strategic outcomes and global standing.
President and the Great White Fleet
Assuming the presidency in 1901, Roosevelt had the authority to implement his vision for the navy fully. The Great White Fleet’s circumnavigation (1907–1909) demonstrated American global reach. Sixteen battleships steamed thousands of miles, coordinated with worldwide coaling stations, and sailed into Tokyo Bay to project power and deter rivals.¹¹
The voyage was a logistical triumph and a strategic statement. Allies, such as Britain, recognized the accomplishment, and Japan noted it as a rising power in the Pacific. Roosevelt used the fleet to signal both capability and resolve, establishing American naval prestige on the world stage.¹²
Naval Power and the Panama Canal
Strategic mobility was central to Roosevelt’s thinking. A two-ocean nation required a rapid fleet transfer capability, and the Panama Canal solved that problem. By securing U.S. control over the canal zone in 1903, Roosevelt ensured that American battleships could move quickly between oceans.¹³
Though completed after his presidency, the canal was a cornerstone of his naval strategy, transforming logistics and projecting American power globally. The United States emerged as a true two-ocean power, ready to deter threats and protect interests worldwide.
The Roosevelt Corollary and Gunboat Diplomacy
Roosevelt expanded the United States' naval power into the Western Hemisphere. The 1904 Roosevelt Corollary asserted the U.S. right to intervene in Latin America to preserve order and protect national interests.¹⁴
The Navy enforced these policies. Gunboats patrolled the Caribbean, deterred European interference, and ensured stability in countries such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Venezuela. Critics called this “gunboat diplomacy,” but Roosevelt considered it necessary. Better that America acts decisively than allow foreign powers to meddle in the hemisphere.
Criticisms and Consequences
Not all supported Roosevelt’s navalism. Battleships were costly, and Congress resisted repeated funding requests. His policies fueled a naval arms race, particularly with Japan, and Latin American nations sometimes resented U.S. interventions.¹⁵
Yet Roosevelt viewed these costs as necessary. Weakness invited aggression, while strength secured respect. His commitment to readiness and global influence laid the foundation for American security and strategic authority.
Legacy
Roosevelt reshaped the U.S. Navy from a modest coastal force into a modern, global fleet. Steel battleships, overseas bases, disciplined crews, and strategic mobility became hallmarks of American naval power. The Spanish-American War, the Great White Fleet, and the Panama Canal all bore his imprint.
He tied naval power to national character and global influence. The Navy embodied the strenuous life: strong, prepared, and unyielding. Roosevelt’s vision endured, providing the framework for America’s later naval dominance in both World War I and World War II, and shaping U.S. strategy into the 20th century.¹⁶
References
H. W. Brands, The Man Who Saved the Republic: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of Power (New York: Doubleday, 2018), 112.
Ibid., 115–118.
Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1979), 27–32.
Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1882).
Ibid., xvii–xxiii.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), 10–12.
Morris, Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, 180–183.
Ibid., 213–216.
Ibid., 220–222.
Brands, The Man Who Saved the Republic, 140–145.
Ibid., 160–162.
Morris, Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, 340–345.
Ibid., 348–350.
Ibid., 355–358.
Brands, The Man Who Saved the Republic, 180–183.
Ibid., 200–203.
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