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Overview - The Lebanon War 1982

Updated: Jul 26

F-15 over Bekka painted by Rick Herter
Rick Herter Art – Showdown Over the Bekka

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The C-130 Hercules hummed on the tarmac at Ramat David Airbase, its hulking silhouette stark against the predawn sky. Ground crews moved with quiet urgency, loading crates of 105mm ammunition, jerrycans of JP-4 fuel, and Galil rifles into the cavernous transport. A new campaign loomed. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), forged in the fire of four wars, now stood at the threshold of a fifth, one they believed would redraw the map of Lebanon and break the PLO’s grip on Israel’s northern border.


The Road to Invasion

The seeds had been planted years earlier. In 1978, following PLO cross-border attacks, the IDF launched Operation Litani, briefly occupying southern Lebanon. The United Nations responded with the creation of UNIFIL, a peacekeeping force that failed to stem the violence. By 1982, the PLO had established a strong presence throughout southern Lebanon, operating artillery batteries, training camps, and a shadow state. Israeli towns such as Kiryat Shmona and Nahariya lived under the constant threat of rocket fire and infiltration.

Tensions reached a boiling point on June 3, 1982, when gunmen from the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. Though not affiliated with the PLO, the attack offered Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon the pretext they had long sought. The casus belli had arrived.

On June 6, 1982, the IDF launched Operation Peace for Galilee.


Steel on the Border

Brigadier General Amos in Lebanon
Brigadier General Amos in Lebanon

Into Lebanon, Brigadier General Amos Yaron stood beside his command vehicle—a Centurion Sho’t Kal tank bristling with reactive armor. Map tables glowed beneath red-filtered lights as orders streamed in from Northern Command, punching through the Litani River line, dismantling the PLO infrastructure, and confronting Syrian forces dug in across the Bekaa Valley. Intelligence painted a deadly picture of PLO fortified positions interlocked with Syrian SA-6 SAM batteries and Soviet-supplied radar.


The 162nd Armored Division spearheaded the invasion. Merkava Mk1 tanks rumbled northward, followed by Golani and Paratroopers Brigades in M113 APCs. AH-1 Cobra helicopters patrolled the valleys, Hellfire missiles loaded, hunting convoys and armor. The offensive combined speed, armor, and infantry, lessons honed in the Sinai, Golan, and Jordan Valley.


Air War over the Bekaa:

Operation Mole Cricket 19 On June 9, the IDF launched Operation Mole Cricket 19, a preemptive strike that redefined aerial warfare. F-15s and F-4 Phantoms baited Syrian air defenses into activating, while F-16s, equipped with AGM-65 Mavericks, eliminated radar systems and SAM batteries with pinpoint accuracy. In a stunning display of electronic warfare and aerial dominance, Israeli pilots downed over 80 Syrian MiGs without suffering a single loss. The skies belonged to Israel.


That supremacy paved the way for A-4 Skyhawks and Kfirs to strike with impunity, destroying PLO artillery, bunkers, and command posts. With Syrian radar blind, Israeli armor surged forward.


Resistance in the South

The PLO did not collapse overnight. Fighters armed with RPG-7s, PKMs, and Strela-2 MANPADS staged ambushes near Tyre and Sidon. Syrian T-62 tanks dug in along ridgelines, trading fire with advancing Merkavas. Israeli gunners utilized thermal sights and advanced fire control systems to dominate engagements, but the terrain and resistance hindered their progress.

Civilians fled burning villages. The deeper the IDF advanced, the murkier the objectives became. Tactical gains multiplied, but the strategic goal of toppling the PLO remained elusive.


The Siege of Beirut

By mid-June, Israeli forces encircled West Beirut, a city fortified with PLO bunkers, Syrian units, and narrow streets ideal for ambush. Israeli artillery pounded suspected positions without pause. Offshore, Sa’ar-class missile boats bombarded coastal defenses. The siege became a media event broadcast live by CNN, BBC, and European outlets. Footage of shattered hospitals, burning neighborhoods, and wounded children lit a firestorm of global condemnation.


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F-15s flew combat air patrols, downing MiG-23s attempting to challenge Israeli dominance. Meanwhile, infantry platoons cleared buildings room by room. Units from the Golani and Nahal Brigades, supported by elite Paratroopers and special reconnaissance forces such as Sayeret Golani, Sayeret Tzanhanim, and Sayeret Matkal, conducted aggressive house-to-house searches and seized fortified PLO command posts across neighborhoods like Fakhani, Sabra, and the dense corridors of West Beirut. Armed with Galil rifles, Uzis, grenades, and demolition charges, they moved methodically through stairwells, alleyways, and rooftop passages, where PLO fighters armed with AK-47s, RPKs, and mortars had created interlocking kill zones and booby-trapped escape routes. Engagements were often fought at point-blank range, forcing Israeli commanders to adapt by rotating frontline squads regularly to avoid fatigue, breakdown in discipline, and combat shock. Despite Israeli air and artillery support, progress was slow and casualties mounted. Civilians—many sheltering in contested buildings or caught between shifting front lines—suffered heavily, with Beirut’s hospitals overwhelmed and neighborhoods reduced to rubble under the sustained bombardment.


Diplomacy and Departure

As the siege dragged on, U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib arrived to negotiate. Behind the scenes, President Ronald Reagan pressed Begin to end the operation. Tensions between Jerusalem and Washington spiked. American officials, particularly Secretary of State George Shultz, warned that continued bombardment risked unraveling U.S. influence in the Arab world.

After protracted talks, a deal emerged:

Yasser Arafat and thousands of PLO fighters would evacuate under international protection. On August 30, Arafat boarded a Greek ship bound for Tunisia. Israel had forced the PLO from Beirut, but the cost remained to be reckoned.


Sabra, Shatila, and Shame

On September 14, Bashir Gemayel, Maronite leader and Israel’s chief ally, was assassinated. His death triggered a brutal retaliation. With clearance from the IDF to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, Phalangist militias slaughtered between 700 and 3,500 civilians over 48 hours. Though Israeli troops did not participate directly, they controlled the perimeter and did nothing to stop the massacre.


International horror followed. Media outlets broadcast footage of mass graves. Global protests erupted. Inside Israel, outrage exploded into the largest demonstration in its history, with over 400,000 citizens marching through Tel Aviv demanding justice.


The Kahan Commission, launched under intense pressure, found that Defense Minister Ariel Sharon bore indirect responsibility. Being forced, he resigned his post. Begin, reeling from the war and the loss of his wife, withdrew from public life and resigned a year later.


Human Element and Internal Israeli Divisions


The Homefront Erupts

The war had fractured Israeli society. What began as a mission to protect the north morphed into an open-ended occupation with shifting goals and rising civilian casualties. The Israeli public, once unified, splintered. Students, rabbis, and reservists marched alongside Holocaust survivors in calling for the war’s end. The idea that Israel, long seen as morally exceptional, had become complicit in war crimes struck deep.


Political fault lines widened. Sharon and Begin clashed over strategy. Senior IDF commanders criticized the lack of coherent goals. Trust between the military and civilian leadership eroded.


Voices from the Field

In the field, Israeli soldiers grappled with a different torment. Many had entered Lebanon believing in their mission. But prolonged occupation, guerrilla ambushes, and the horror of Sabra and Shatila corroded morale. Patrols turned deadly. IEDs became a daily threat. Soldiers questioned whether they were protecting Israel or propping up a failed policy.


Some soldiers reported trying to intervene during the massacre. Others watched helplessly. Many returned home changed and haunted not by battle, but by complicity and confusion.


Yesh Gvul and the Refusenik Movement

Out of that crisis emerged Yesh Gvul, “There Is a Limit.” In 1982, dozens of IDF reservists refused to return to Lebanon. They believed that service must obey moral boundaries. By 1983, the movement swelled to hundreds. Refuseniks faced prison and public condemnation, but they also ignited a national debate about the IDF’s role in foreign wars.


Their dissent laid the foundation for future challenges to military policies in the West Bank and Gaza. It also marked the beginning of a new kind of Israeli protest—one led by soldiers, not politicians.


Occupation and Resistance

The IDF established a Security Zone in southern Lebanon, relying on the South Lebanon Army (SLA) to maintain order. But the war had spawned a new enemy. Backed by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah emerged as a Shiite resistance movement more radical, more organized, and more determined than the PLO.


By 1983, Hezbollah launched its first attacks, ambushing IDF patrols, firing Katyusha rockets, and planting IEDs. What had started as a conventional war devolved into a grinding, asymmetric insurgency.


Withdrawal and Aftermath

By 1985, Israel withdrew most of its forces, retaining only a narrow southern strip. The dream of a friendly Lebanon had collapsed. In the power vacuum, militias battled for control. The War of the Camps consumed West Beirut as Hezbollah, Amal, and PLO remnants turned on each other. Syria cemented its grip, while U.S. Marines were deployed to stabilize the region, making them targets in a devastating barracks bombing that killed 241 American servicemen.


Legacy

The First Lebanon War claimed over 17,000 lives, most of them Lebanese civilians. 657 IDF soldiers were killed. Syrian and PLO losses ranged in the thousands. Beirut was reduced to ruins. Trust in Israel’s political class eroded. And a new, more dangerous enemy, Hezbollah, rose from the ashes.


For the IDF, the war shattered assumptions. Urban warfare, prolonged occupation, and ambiguous objectives exposed critical gaps. Those lessons informed later operations, including Operation Defensive Shield (2002) during the Second Intifada, where coordination between air, armor, and intelligence improved—but the moral dilemmas remained.


Conclusion: Firestorm Without End

In 1982, tanks rolled north to secure peace. What followed was a firestorm that redrew alliances, shattered illusions, and inaugurated a new era of conflict. The First Lebanon War delivered no lasting peace, only hardened lines and deepened wounds. Its legacy still reverberates, from the streets of Beirut to the hills of southern Lebanon, from the Israeli cabinet to the conscience of its soldiers.

The war ended, but its consequences did not.



Book ReferenceRabin, Yitzhak. The Rabin Memoirs. Edited by Dov Goldstein. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.


Article ReferenceSmith, Jordan. "Yitzhak Rabin and the Pursuit of Peace: Reflections on Leadership." Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 4 (1999): 451-472.


Speech ReferenceRabin, Yitzhak. "Remarks at the Signing of the Oslo Accords." Speech delivered at the White House, Washington, DC, September 13, 1993. The transcript is available at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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